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In its recent decision in Medellin v. Texas, the U.S. Supreme
Court had to decide whether the conviction of a murderer should be
1
reopened in light of U.S. obligations under public international law.
After a Texan Court had found the petitioner, a Mexican citizen,
guilty of capital murder and sentenced him to death, the International
Court of Justice (ICJ) had decided that the Court had violated
Medellin’s rights under the Vienna Convention to notify the Mexican
Consulate, and ordered the United States “to provide, by means of its
own choosing, review and reconsideration of the conviction[] and sentence[].”2 The U.S. Supreme Court, however, denied Medellín’s appeal to have his conviction reopened.
Among the many fascinating aspects in the opinion, one concerns
the effect of the ICJ decision. The Court refused Medellín’s contention that “giving the Avena judgment binding effect in domestic
courts simply conforms to the proposition that domestic courts gener3
ally give effect to foreign judgments,” with the response that
“Medellín does not ask us to enforce a foreign-court judgment set-
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tling a typical commercial or property dispute.”4 This must mean that
there is, in the Court’s view, a crucial difference between the enforcement of a private law judgment (commercial or property), which
is almost a matter of course, and a public law judgment, which requires special justification. Further, the fact that no real argument follows suggests the difference must be so obvious that it needs no further discussion; merely pointing it out seems enough.
The difference is indeed normally viewed as obvious, but on
closer thought it is anything but that. After all, in domestic law, the
public/private distinction is widely discarded. Legal realism taught us
long ago that private law is “really” public law. Property and contract
are not truly private institutions; they are expansions of state sovereignty, public powers vested in rightsholders to engage the state’s
help in enforcing their interest. Private law performs public functions
of the state, and it is administered by public institutions, namely the
courts of the state. Many private law scholars will discuss their fields
with public functions in mind: economic efficiency and social welfare
maximization, deterrence of socially undesirable conduct, etc.
Occasionally, similar claims that private and public are now
merged are made in the international realm. By and large, however,
the distinction between private and public international law still holds.
In fact, public and private international lawyers rarely even talk to
each other. Public international lawyers focus on the relations between sovereign states. When they look to private actors, their question is whether these actors can be viewed as subjects of international
law, not whether they threaten the essentially public character of public international law altogether. When they speak about human rights,
they think of public rights in the relation between states and individuals, not of private rights between individuals. Mostly, private transactions are not an issue for public international law. Private international lawyers, by contrast, are aware of the significant impact that
public international law has on their field, especially through treaties
and through doctrines like sovereign immunity, the act of state doctrine, and others. They are also concerned with the effect of human
rights on private law. In fact, international conflict of laws is sometimes thought of as part of public international law. But traditionally,
private international lawyers do not care much about those debates in
public international law that have no immediate impact on their field.

4. Id.
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International courts and customary international law seem irrelevant
to them.
The Duke Journal for International and Comparative Law thus
chose a highly important and topical topic for its annual conference,
from which the contributions to this issue are derived. In fact, when
my colleague Curtis Bradley and I discussed the topic, we both agreed
that the public/private distinction in the international realm was undertheorized, although our own intuitions led us in opposite ways:
Curt thought the private should be treated more like the public, I felt
the public should be treated more like the private. At the same time,
the conference was the result of a very fruitful cooperation between
the journal and Duke’s Center for International and Comparative
Law, where the Journal was involved in the programmatic planning
and organization and the Center provided financial and institutional
support. The result was a successful conference and an impressive
journal issue. The debate between public and private international
lawyers is so fruitful because it helps go beyond the superficial and
somewhat trite insight that public and private international law overlap and mutually influence each other. Instead, I would argue, three
big questions emerge. They run through all panels and almost all contributions.
The first question is an educational one: What can public and private international law learn from each other? Where do parallel debates in public and private international law exist that should be
linked? To what extent are experiences made in one field fruitful for
the other?
We find this addressed in all panels. Take the question of the
third panel: private arbitral decisions and international court judgments. Decisions by arbitral tribunals are regularly enforced; decisions of public international courts, by contrast, receive merely “respectful consideration.” Is this consistent? Does it help to say one is
private and the other public, given that U.S. courts will even enforce
arbitral awards dealing with U.S. public international law (antitrust
law)? Or take the question of the fourth panel: acceptance and enforcement of private and public international law. We regularly enforce foreign private law through conflict of laws, but we hesitate with
regard to foreign and international public law. Is this justified? Can
the current discussion on the role of public international law in domestic law learn from the debate in choice of law, seventy years old,
on the role of foreign law in domestic proceedings?
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Perhaps the educational question becomes most pertinent in the
first panel, concerning the role of custom in public and private international law. Public international law observes a hot debate about
customary international law, addressed in this issue by Patrick Kelly.
Does customary international law exist at all? If so, is it law? What
are its sources, especially what is the role of state consent versus state
practice? If practice, where can we find such practice – in texts and official pronouncements, or in actual conduct of states? Is customary international law legitimate as opposed to law formally sanctioned by
the state? Is a return to natural law unavoidable? And what is its role
in domestic courts?
The private international lawyer observing this debate feels a
certain déja vu. Private international law has viewed a very similar
debate for decades now, relating to customary private international
law in the form of lex mercatoria, the alleged customary law of international commerce, addressed here by Jan Dalhuisen. All the topics
of the customary international law debate can be found in the lex
mercatoria debate. Does lex mercatoria even exist outside the heads
of professors who proclaim it? Is lex mercatoria actually law or merely
custom? Are its sources in state law or in commercial practices? And
if the latter, can we find it in texts, most notably the UNIDROIT
Principles of International Commercial Contracts? Or must we search
in actual commercial conduct? Is lex mercatoria legitimate, given that
it is not established in democratic procedures? Is it some kind of natural law of commerce? And what is the role of lex mercatoria in domestic courts? Can it be applied under a choice-of-law analysis?
A second question is practical. It concerns the mutual substitutability of public and private international law and institutions. Can
public and private international law, public and private adjudicatory
bodies perform similar functions? And if so, which of them is preferable? Can we substitute one for the other?
Again, this is a topic for all panels. But it is addressed especially
in the second panel that compares courts and arbitration. Investment
disputes are an obvious example. Some investors go to domestic
courts to bring suit against defaulting sovereigns, for example Argentina. Others use arbitration to bring the same claims. Is one of them
more appropriate than the other? Should we worry that arbitrators
might give too little deference to state sovereignty? Or is it perhaps
even the case that appears arbitrators give more deference to sovereignty than state courts? The competition is not confined to adjudicatory bodies; it also goes to the applicable law. If Argentina claims in-
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ability to pay because it needs the money to provide its sovereign
functions, is this a public international law claim or a private law
claim? A public sovereign cannot go into insolvency, but an argument
can be made that it should retain the power to fulfill its sovereign
functions first. A private creditor can of course become insolvent, but
outside of this, he cannot usually rely on shortage of assets or on
competing obligations. We may want to say that if the problems at
stake are mostly political, they belong into international courts; if
they are largely commercial, they should go to arbitration. But are investment disputes not intrinsically both?
Thomas Carbonneau emphasizes the private character of arbitration and suggests this guarantees its superiority for business relations.
Christopher Whytock by contrast focuses on the eminently public
function of transnational governance that courts perform even where
they adjudicate private transactions. Charles Brower, finally, demonstrates how the character of international dispute solution shifted
over time, from a private understanding to a much more public one.
Quite ironically, private law was long adjudicated by public courts,
whereas public international law usually found its way into quasiprivate arbitration. Only recently have we seen a shift – private law
goes to private arbitration, public international law to public international courts. Now, public and private adjudication stand in competition, especially for areas that transcend public/private law.
A third set of questions, finally, is theoretical. It goes back to
what I began with: the public/private distinction on the international
sphere. Is the distinction dead here as well? And if not, what are its
specificities? The third and the fourth panel address these questions,
but really they transcend all panels.
One view would be to ignore the insights from the domestic
question and maintain that, at least on the international sphere, public and private are essentially different. Thus, Mark Movsesian argues
that arbitration is essentially private and consensual and thus raises
no great issues of legitimacy, or of enforcement; public international
law by contrast is highly political and therefore problematic. Ernie
Young agrees on the distinction and goes even one step further: if international law is the highest law, he argues, its interpretation must
largely be exercised by domestic courts. So, private law can be transnational; public law, including public international law, remains domestic.
Another view would directly translate the insights from the domestic sphere into the international sphere. If the public/private di-
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vide is dead, then we should treat arbitral tribunals and international
law exactly the same. Maybe we should enforce foreign public law in
the same way in which we traditionally enforce foreign private law,
and so on. Bill Dodge does not go this far, but he does question the
public law taboo, the doctrine that rejects the application of foreign
public law. Ron Brand also questions the distinction, especially in
light of the US experience with private enforcement of public law.
Melissa Waters, finally, discusses various ways in which the relationship between domestic law and the ICJ should be conceptualized –
some borrowed from public, some from private international law.
A third possibility is that the public/private distinction exists, but
in a way different from that in the domestic sphere. It is not even exactly clear what the public and what the private is. Are states representatives of common, public interests? Or are they individual actors,
engaging in essentially private relations with other states? Is contract
still an expansion of sovereignty? Or is sovereignty an expansion of
contract, if the state’s competence to adjudicate and regulate is based
on a choice of law and choice of court agreement by private parties,
and if states, in order to receive credit, must contract out their sovereign rights? If this is so, the global adjudication system looks importantly different from the domestic system, and it is high time to start
understanding it.
What can public and private learn from each other? To what extent can we substitute public and private for each other? In what way
are public and private distinct or similar on the transnational sphere?
These are not easy questions, and the fact that they have rarely been
asked so far does not make it easier to respond to them. The contributions in this issue bring us closer to a response, and this is huge
progress.

